This paper studies the extension of Harsanyi's theorem (Harsanyi, 1955) in a framework involving uncertainty. It seeks to extend the aggregation result to a wide class of Monotonic Bernoullian and Archimedean preferences (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011) that subsumes many models of choice under uncertainty proposed in the literature. An impossibility result is obtained, unless we are in the specific framework where all individuals and the decision-maker are subjective expected utility maximizers sharing the same beliefs. This implies that non-expected utility preferences cannot be aggregated consistently. This note is a deeply revised version of a previous paper entitled "Harsanyi's theorem without the sure-thing principle", which was circulated in 2010. I am indebted to Philippe Mongin and Marcus Pivato for detailed comments on the earlier version. I am also grateful to Jean-Marc Tallon for helpful discussion on the recent literature and useful references. I remain of course responsible for any mistake or misinterpretation.
1 Introduction Harsanyi (1955) proved the following theorem: if (i) all individuals and the social observer are expected utility maximizers on the set of simple lotteries over a set Y ;
(ii) whenever all individuals prefer lottery p to lottery q, the social observer must also prefer p to q (the Pareto principle); then the social observer's utility function must be an affine combination of individuals' von Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions.
This result is known as Harsanyi's aggregation theorem.
The purpose of this note is to take up the issue considered by Harsanyi, namely the aggregation of preferences, but when uncertainty rather than risk prevails. In that context, the basic model is Subjective Expected Utility (henceforth SEU, see Savage, 1954) , which captures beliefs through a probability distribution. But this model has been challenged, in particular because the Sure-Thing Principle (holding that outcomes which occur regardless of which action is chosen should not affect one's preferences) is often violated by individual decision makers.
In this note, we considerably widen the investigation by considering a large class of preferences, namely Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean preferences (henceforth MBA preferences, see Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011) . This model permits a separation between tastes and ambiguous beliefs (represented by a set of probability distributions), in a specific sense. It also encompasses many models of decision under uncertainty that have been proposed recently, in particular the Choquet expected utility model by Schmeidler (1989) , the multiple-prior preferences by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , the variational preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) and the second order expected utility model by Klibanoff, Marinacci and, Mukerji (2005) and Ergin and Gul (2009) 
Our main result is that agents' MBA preferences can be aggregated into MBA social preferences only in the very specific case where all individuals and the society have SEU preferences and share the same beliefs. In that case, it is also shown that the social aggregation rule is very specific, namely the social SEU is an affine combination of the agents SEU. Hence a consistent social aggregation of preferences is impossible as soon as at least one of the following is true: (i) agents have different beliefs; (ii) agents have non-SEU preferences.
It is already known that in models of decision under uncertainty it may not be possible to aggregate beliefs and tastes in a consistent way. Hylland and Zeckhauser 1979) and Mongin (1995 Mongin ( , 1998 showed that for SEU preferences: when individuals are simultaneously heterogeneous in terms of tastes and beliefs, it is impossible to aggregate individual preferences into an SEU social preference. A key issue is "spurious unanimity": opposite beliefs and tastes may induce people to agree that a decision is better for conflicting reasons.
In the case of ambiguous beliefs, few results on preference aggregation exist in the literature. Chambers and Hayashi (2006) considered a Savage framework, where decision makers may have non-SEU preferences. They showed that, when individuals have different beliefs, eventwise monotonicity is incompatible with the Pareto axiom. Our setting further weaken eventwise dominance to statewise dominance (monotonicity).
Yet, we are able to obtain an impossibility similar to the one they describe even when people have the same beliefs. Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud (2008) showed that, within the class of "Rank-Dependent Additive"preferences, a consistent aggregation is impossible, even if all individuals have the same beliefs, unless the society and the individual are uncertainty neutral (which occurs in the SEU model). However, their aggregation result is obtained for a smaller class of preferences than the one studied in this note.
The paper closest to ours is Mongin and Pivato (2015) , which was written independently of the present note. Their conclusion, like ours, is that consistent aggregations of preferences can be achieved only if (i) the individuals and the observer are all SEU maximizers, and (ii) they use the same subjective probabilities. Technically, their method of proof is similar to ours. It is based on the key insight provided by Blackorby, Donaldson and Mongin (2004) that the Pareto principle and monotonicity (or statewise dominance) impose separability conditions. Combining these separability conditions yield an additive separable representation. Their paper has a more general framework than the one in this note: it encompasses other frameworks than choice under uncertainty. But they also assume technical structural conditions (that the set of feasible alternative is connected, sectionally connected, and indifference connected for the social ordering). In the Anscombe-Aumann framework (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) , we do not need such structural assumptions, but only standard and easily interpretable choice-theoretic premisses. Recently, Herzberg (2013) also obtained an impossibility result for the class of MBA preferences we consider in this note. But he does so within an Arrovian aggregation framework, using an aggregator desideratum of systematicity. In this note, we do not impose such regularity constraints on the social aggregator.
Other papers are related to this note. Fleurbaey (2009) studied the aggregation of expected utility individual preferences into a non-expected utility social preference ordering, which satisfies statewise dominance. He obtained that the social aggregation must be affine so that society must use an expected utility to evaluate prospects.
We also find this affine aggregation when individuals' preferences are SEU. This note broadens the investigation to non SEU individual preferences and does not assume objective probabilities. Our proof is nonetheless related to his, for it relies on functional equations.
More generally, there is a strand of the literature studying the consistency of ex ante and ex post social judgements. Most of the literature has focused on the expected utility case, to show that the Utilitarian rule is the only one that can be used consistently ex ante and ex post (see in particular Hammond, 1981; Myerson, 1981; Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark, 1999) . The present note also seeks consistent social judgements, but enlarges the study to non-expected utility preferences. It shows that not only the social aggregation rule matters, but also the kind of preferences that are aggregated.
Specifically, we show that only SEU preferences with common beliefs can be aggregated consistently.
The remainder of the note is divided into three sections and one appendix. In Section 2, we lay down the model and define MBA preferences. In Section 3, we present the result concerning the possibility of consistent aggregation of preferences (Theorem 1). In Section 4, we discuss this result and several directions that can be explored to go beyond it. An appendix provides the proof of Theorem 1.
The framework
Consider a society made of a finite number of agents N = {1, · · · , N }. Let N 0 = {0, 1, · · · , N } where 0 refers to society.
set of alternatives is a a product space. This is less general than Mongin and Pivato (2015) and the present note.
Uncertainty is modeled using the Anscombe-Aumann framework (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) . There is a finite set S = {1, · · · , S} of states of the world. Let C be a non-empty set of consequences and X = ∆(C) be the set of simple lotteries over C (that is lotteries with finite support). Let A be the set of acts, that is, mappings f : S → X.
Since X is a mixture space, the mixture operation αx + (1 − α)y is well-defined for all α ∈ [0, 1] and x, y ∈ X, and αx + (1 − α)y ∈ X. We will identify X with the subset of sure acts, that is acts x ∈ A such that x(s) = x for all s ∈ S, where x ∈ X. One can also define a mixture operation on A in the following way: for any f, g ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1],
We model the preferences of an agent i ∈ N on A by a binary relation i , and denote by i and ∼ i its symmetric and asymmetric components. Society's preferences are denoted 0 , with similar definitions.
Let us now define some properties of binary relations over A. The first property guarantees that preferences are complete orderings that can be represented by continuous utility functions.
Property 1 (Regularity). The binary relation satisfies:
a. Completeness. For all f, g ∈ A either f g or g f (or both).
b. Transitivity. For all f, g, h ∈ A, if f g and g h then f h.
c. Archimedean. For all f, g, h ∈ A, if f g and g h then there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1)
The second property is a dominance property that guarantees the consistency between preferences over acts and preferences over lotteries in each state of the world.
Note that we use a strong version of Monotonicity, which implies the sensitivity to each state of the world. This also means that we rule out the existence of null states. This is done for the sake of simplicity, to avoid some complications with dealing with null states that would not change the message of the present note.
The last property is the VNM independence axiom restricted to risk situations where probabilities are known.
Property 3 (Risk independence).
For all x, y, z ∈ X, if x y, then for all
For any set Z, and function v : Z → R, we define Rg(v) = {a ∈ R : ∃z ∈ Z, a = v(z)}. Let B be an interval in R, a monotonic function I : B S → R is normalized if
Definition 1. The binary relation on A is a Monotonic Bernoullian Archimedean (MBA) preference ordering if there exist an affine function u : X → R and a continuous increasing and normalized function I : Rg(u) → R such that, for all f, g ∈ A,
Moreover, if v : X → R and I v : Rg(v) → R also satisfy (1) and I v is normalized, then there exist λ ∈ R ++ and µ ∈ R such that v(x) = λu(x) + µ for all x ∈ X and
MBA preferences are characterized by the three properties introduced above. MBA preferences encompass many decision models proposed in the literature on choice under uncertainty. In particular it encompasses the SEU model.
Definition 2. A binary relation on A is a subjective expected utility (SEU) preference ordering if there exists a vector (p 1 , · · · , p S ) ∈ (0, 1) S with s∈S p s = 1 and an affine function u : X → R such that, for all f, g ∈ A,
In the above definition, the vector (p 1 , · · · , p S ) is the subjective probability distribution used by the decision maker. When two decision makers have preferences that are SEU preference orderings, and when they have the same subjective probability distribution, we say that they share the same beliefs.
3 The (im)possibility of consistent aggregations of MBA preferences
Let us now turn to the aggregation of preferences. We assume that all decision makers (including society) have MBA preferences orderings i , i ∈ N 0 . We also assume that there exists some diversity among the individual preferences that we seek to aggregate.
It is represented by the following assumption that is known in the literature as the 'independent prospects' property (Weymark, 1991; Mongin, 1998) . In that case, there exist weights (a 1 , · · · , a N ) ∈ R N + such that, for all f, g ∈ A:
where (p 1 , · · · , p S ) ∈ (0, 1) S is the individuals' subjective probability distribution. Furthermore the weight vector (a 1 , · · · , a N ) ∈ R N + is unique, and the affine functions u i are unique up to positive affine transformations with a common multiplier.
The first part of Theorem 1 is an impossibility result. It states that it is impossible to consistently aggregate preferences under uncertainty, unless individuals and the society have SEU preferences and share the same beliefs. In particular, SEU preferences cannot be aggregated when individuals have different beliefs (Mongin, 1995) . And non-SEU preferences cannot be aggregated even when people share the same beliefs (Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud, 2008) . Theorem 1 thus generalizes existing impossibility results.
The second part is the extension of Harsanyi's results to the Anscombe-Aumann framework when people are SEU and share the same beliefs. The social welfare function must be an affine aggregation of individuals' SEU. This specific aggregation has been best described as generalized utilitarian (for clear and comprehensive reviews of the ethical significance of Harsanyi's theorem, see Weymark, 1991; Mongin and d'Aspremont, 1998 ). It may is problematic for societies wishing to incorporate fairness into their decision making process.
As already noted by Diamond (1967), Harsanyi's aggregation procedure prevents ex ante equity considerations requiring progressive transfers of expected utility to be welfare improving. Myerson (1981) also noted the difficulty of defining egalitarian principles in risky situations. In the more general framework of dynamic choice under uncertainty, Bommier and Zuber (2012) have already proved that rational Paretian social observers must have the same aversion to inequality. Theorem 1 further specifies this result by implying that inequality aversion is nil (with respect to specific normalizations of the expected utilities). Another issue is that of ex post equity. Fleurbaey (2010) has proposed a specific weakening of the Pareto principle to deal with it.
Discussion
Theorem 1 states that it is generally impossible to consistently aggregate MBA individual preferences into MBA social preferences. To escape the impossibility, several directions can be explored.
An important condition for Theorem 1 to hold is Assumption 1. Of course, if the assumption is true for some individuals in N only, the impossibility would still hold (we only lose the uniqueness of the weights a i in Equation 3 ). To recover a possibility result, we need to assume that all individuals have the same preferences on X. This assumption was made by Crès, Gilboa and Vieille (2011) . They showed that it is then possible to aggregate agents beliefs in a consistent way within the multiple prior preference model. This finding is interesting but it seems restrictive to assume that people have exactly the same risk preferences. The result is however useful if we focus on the aggregation of preferences restricted to common-taste uncertain options (see Danan et al., 2015) .
Another option would be to widen the scope of admissible social preferences beyond MBA preferences. An option that has widely been explored is to allow social preferences to be state-dependent. Within the SEU framework, Mongin (1998) obtained a possibility result: although agents have different beliefs, it is possible to obtain a state dependent SEU social ordering, which is an affine combination of agents ex ante expected utilities. Similar results have been presented by Chambers and Hayashi (2006) . However, allowing for state dependence at the social level cannot restore the possibility for non-SEU preferences (see Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud, 2008; Mongin and Pivato, 2015) . The results of the present note could be extended to allow state dependence, without modifying the result. Another possibility would be to completely drop the requirement of Monotonicity (or statewise dominance). This is actually what was suggested by the literature promoting ex ante equity in the context of risk and uncertainty (see for instance Diamond, 1967; Epstein and Segal, 1992) , but one then has to deal with the issue of time consistency (Machina, 1989) .
A last option to restore possibilities would be to weaken the Pareto principle. A first direction would be to only use the Weak Pareto principle. This would make possible dictatorial choices, where the society always makes decision using the preference ordering of a specific individual. Positional dictatorships (such as Maxmin) are however not possible in general (see Chambers and Hayashi, 2014) . Other weakened versions of the Pareto principle have been proposed. To avoid spurious unanimities Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler (2004) proposed to restrict the use of the Pareto principle to cases where SEU agents have the same beliefs. Danan et al. (2015) have recently shown that this not enough if we want to study MBA preferences: even with identical sets of belief, agents may agree to prefer situations which are socially dominated in each state of the world. Danan et al. (2015) hence further restricted the Pareto principle to apply to common-taste outcomes (they call this principle the common-taste robust Pareto principle). Brunnermeier et al. (2014) proposed a similar version of the Pareto principle. Gilboa, Samuelson and Schmeidler (2014) proposed a stronger notion of nobetting Pareto dominance. This route is thus a promising avenue for research. One limitation, though, is that affine aggregations of utilities are in general still obtained (see for instance Gilboa, Samet and Schmeidler, 2004; Danan et al., 2015) . Fairness issues, such as those discussed Section 3, remain unresolved by the use of such weakened Pareto principles.
Appendix
Assume that all agents have MBA preferences on A, and that social preferences are also MBA. By Proposition 1, for any i ∈ N 0 there exist an affine function u i : X → R and a continuous increasing and normalized function I i : Rg(u i ) → R such that, for all f, g ∈ A,
The following Lemma concerns the aggregation in risky situations.
Lemma 1. There exist unique weights (a 1 , · · · , a N ) ∈ R N ++ and a constant b ∈ R such that, for all x ∈ X:
Proof. Applying the Strong Pareto principle to preferences restricted to X, this follows from the results by Fishburn (1984, Theorem 2 and Corollary 1).
The set U is a nonempty convex subspace of R N of dimension N . 2 Hence U S is also a nonempty convex subspace of R N ×S of dimension N S. A vector v ∈ U S has coordinates v s i , meaning that there exists f ∈ A such that, for any i ∈ N and any s ∈ S, v s i = u i f (s) . For all i ∈ N , we now define the relations * i over U S in the following way. For any v,ṽ ∈ U S and any f, g ∈ A such that v s i = u i f (s) and v s i = u i f (s) for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S:
Hence, using Equation (4), for all i ∈ N and all v,ṽ ∈ U S , v * iṽ
By Lemma 1, it must also be the case that, for all v,ṽ ∈ U S ,
The following Lemma lists some properties of relation * 0 .
Lemma 2. The relation * 0 on U S is complete, transitive, continuous and all indifference sets of * 0 are connected subsets of U S .
Proof. That * 0 is complete, transitive and continuous is proved by the fact that it is represented on U S by a continuous real-valued function (Equation 7). Case 2:S = ∅ and S = ∅ orS = ∅ and S = ∅. This is impossible: because I 0 is increasing, this would imply either v ≺ṽ or v ṽ, which is a contradiction.
Case 3:S = ∅ and S = ∅. For λ ∈ (0, 1), we have 0
We denote µ(λ) this number, which is unique. 4 We also take µ(0) = 1 and µ (1) andṽ whose elements are on the same indifference curve as v andṽ. The segment of the indifference curve between v andṽ is path connected.
All indifference sets of * 0 are path-connected and thus connected.
The function
The Strong Pareto principle and the definition of * i also imply that:
We have the following Lemma:
There exists a continuous and increasing function W : K → R such that for all f ∈ A:
Proof. Under Pareto Indifference (which is implied for preferences over U S by property P*), Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1999, Lemma 1, p. 369; Lemma 2, p.370) showed that there must exist a continuous social aggregator function W . Condition P* further entails that W must be increasing in each of its components.
By definition of the V i functions, using Equation (8), and denoting, for each s ∈ S, w s : U → R the function such that
∈ U, the following equation holds for any v ∈ U S :
Consider any open box K in R N ×S which is a subspace of U S . The functional equation (9) holds for any vector in K. Given that the functions I 0 , W , w and I i are And, for all s ∈ S:
The only possibility to have
all continuous and increasing, the solution of the functional equation is (see Aczél and Maksa, 1996, Theorem 5) :
where the real functions Φ, ψ s , φ i , ϕ s i are continuous and increasing. But we also know that, for any s ∈ S and (v s
Combining with Equation (12), we obtain the following Pexider equation on a rectangular non-empty subset of U: But, since int(U S ) is convex and * 0 -indifference connected (Lemma 2), we know by Theorem 2.2 of Chateauneuf and Wakker (1993) that this local fully additive representation extends globally to the whole set int(U S ). Furthermore, this global additive representation is unique up to a positive affine transformation. This implies that the weight vectors (p 1 , · · · , p S ) ∈ (0, 1) S and (a 1 , · · · , a N ) ∈ R N + are uniquely defined. Last, since U S is convex and * 0 is continuous, the representation also extends to the boundaries of U S .
Combining Equations (13), that ϕ s i (v s i ) = π s a i v s i + κ s i on the relevant domain, and the fact that I i is normalized, we obtained that, for any (v 1 i , · · · , v S i ) ∈ R S such that there exists f ∈ A for which u i f (s) = v s i :
Denote p s = πs s∈S πs for all s ∈ S. The vector (p 1 , · · · , p S ) ∈ (0, 1) S uniquely defines a probability distribution over states of the world. And, because individuals have MBA preferences, we obtain that for all i ∈ N and f, g ∈ A:
By Definition 2 the individuals must therefore have SEU preferences and use the same subjective probability distribution (p 1 , · · · , p S ).
Combining Equations (10) and (12), and using ϕ s i (v s i ) = π s a i v s i + κ s i on the relevant domain and that I 0 is normalized, we also get that, for any v ∈ U S : 
